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A NEW, BALANCED SYSTEM OF DETENTION: AN
ANALYSIS OF NEAL KATYAL AND JACK GOLDSMITH'S
PROPOSAL FOR "A TERRORISTS' COURT"
Leah Ceee 0. Boomsma'
Just months after 9/11, Professor Neal Katyal was reading the
New York Times over breakfast when he learned of President Bush's
order for military commissions.I Two days later, Katyal entered his
constitutional law class at Yale Law School and said, "I found
something
that I think is unconstitutional and the court should say
'2
SO .

Since that time, Katyal has acted on his beliefs. In 2005, he
presented his opinions at William Mitchell College of Law's forum
on "Special Tactics for a Secret War." Katyal asserted that the
President was trying to create a unilateral and unchecked power to
act outside the Constitution and international treaties. Then, after
four years and 5,000 pro bono hours,4 Katyal argued this opinion to
the highest court in the nation, and won.
Katyal's victory at the United States Supreme Court was only
the first step. He has continued to advocate for improvements to
the terrorist trial system.

t J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2009. The author would
like to thank Professor A. John Radsan for his valuable advice, the staff from the
Journal of the National Security Forum for all their work and assistance, and her
family, including her husband Don Boomsma, father Kerry Doyle, and sister-in-law
Gwen Mitchell-Doyle, for their encouragement and input.
1. Marie Brenner, Taking on Guantanamo, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2007, at 334
(describing the legal and personal challenges overcome by Charles Swift and Neal
Katyal while contesting the President's military tribunals).
2. Neal Katyal, Professor of Law, Georgetown University, Remarks at William
Mitchell College of Law National Security Forum: Special Tactics for a Secret War
(Oct. 28, 2005) (audio available at http://www.wmitchell.edu/multimedia/
?file=NSF/2005-10-28-Special-Tactics-for-a-SecretWar.mp3&title=Special%20
Tactics%20for%20a%20 Secret%20War).
3. Id.
4. David McKay Wilson, A Patriot'sAct, DARTMOUTH ALUMNI MAG., July/Aug.
2006, at 34 (profiling Neal Katyal as the pro bono attorney in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld).
5. Brenner, supranote 1, at 334.
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HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD: THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM

Because of his concerns about the constitutionality of the
Guantanamo detainment, Katyal agreed to represent Salim
Hamdan. When Hamdan asked why he was so dedicated the case,
Katyal responded, "I'm doing it for you because my parents had
come from India to America because of a simple reason . . .
America doesn't treat people differently because of where they
come from." 6 He later expanded, "[w]e fought a civil war in part
about the idea that all people are guaranteed certain rights, and
chief among those is a right to a fair trial."7
Because of Katyal's ceaseless efforts to protect the right to a
fair trial, in Hamdan v. Runufeld the Supreme Court rendered the
President's military commissions illegal. In the moments following
the decision, a senator who approached Katyal to congratulate him
proclaimed, "'[s]oon we are going to have real trials that the nation
can be proud of.' 9 In the wake of Hamdan, however, Congress
merely replaced the President's military commissions with a system
of its own design. Despite the Military Commissions Act (MCA),'°
military commissions continued to draw extensive criticism from
many, including Katyal.
A year later, Katyal joined his political opposite, Jack
Goldsmith, in a proposal for "real" trials to deal with terrorists.
The proposal became known as "A Terrorists' Court."'"
It is a
bipartisan call for the United States to rethink the structure of
detainment and initiate discussion within the executive and
legislative branches to create a sensible, congressionally-approved
2
terrorists.'
institution for trying and detaining
As the senator told Katyal, the time has come for a new system
of detaining and prosecuting alleged terrorists that gives not just
the appearance, but also the reality of humane treatment under

6. Law Professor Beats the Odds with High Court Win (NPR broadcast Sept. 5,
2006),
transcript available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/
documents /npr.pdf.
7. Id.
8. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2798 (2006).
9. Brenner, supra note 1, at 339.
10. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
11. Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2007, at A19.
12. Id.
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the law.' 3 Concluding his presentation at William Mitchell College
of Law in October of 2005, Katyal stated, ",it's time for Congress to
step up to the plate," meaning it is time to institute a long-term
solution for detainment that will rebuild the4 United States'
reputation both internationally and domestically.'
II.

THE DILEMMA: BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY ANDJUDICIAL
INTEGRITY

The significant challenge in dealing with terrorist detainment
is balancing national security imperatives with the interest of
fairness and integrity in the judicial process.15 The two existing
systems in which terrorists could be tried or detained fall on
opposite extremes of this scale. "Neither the criminal nor the
military model in its traditional guise can easily meet the central
legal challenge of modern terrorism: the legitimate preventive
incapacitation of uniformless terrorists who have the capacity to
inflict mass casualties and enormous economic harms and who thus
must be stopped before they act."' 6 The detainment system in
Guantanamo employs the executive-created military commissions
that seek to protect the nation from some of its worst security
threats. However, this protection comes at a cost; since the war has
no obvious end there is a risk of "erroneous long-term detentions"'7
that sacrifice individual freedom, right to trial, and judicial
integrity. As an alternative, the federal criminal court system offers
a full range of legal protections for a defendant including a
presumption of innocence and a high standard of proof. But being
ill-equipped to protect the nation from security threats through a
system of preventative detainment, these protections are still not
enough. Neither option provides a long-term, sustainable system
for trying, charging, and detaining terrorists.

13. Glenn Sulmasy, The National Security Court: A Natural Evolution, JURIST:
LEGAL NEWS & RES., May 11, 2006, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
forumy/2006 /05/national-security-court-natural.php.
14. Katyal, supranote 2.
15. Andrew C. McCarthy, Abu Ghraib & Enemy Combatants, NAT'L REv., May 11,
2004, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTZjNWFjNmEzYzA5ZDIhZWIwMDU
2 MTcOYmEwODFjY2U=.
16. Robert M. Chesney &Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008)
(manuscript at 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1055501).
17. Id.
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Guantanamo Bay has put the United States on the defense. A
former State Department official, Matthew Waxman, reasons that
"[e]ven if Guantanamo Bay could be defended in legal or moral
terms, it still hurts us more than it helps us in battling al-Qaeda."'
While Guantanamo Bay benefited the United States by
"incapacitat[ing] many al-Qaeda plotters and has given the U.S.
Government a better picture of the enemy ...those benefits came

at a serious cost."' 9 In Waxman's experience, he "often spent
valuable time and diplomatic capital fruitlessly defending our
detention practices rather than fostering counterterrorism
teamwork."2
He found that the harmful reputation created by
Guantanamo Bay "leaves us playing defense and hinders our ability
to play effective offense."2 ' It has detracted from the United States'
ability 2to provide leadership and policy guidance in the global
arena.
Since Guantanamo Bay does not provide a long-term
resolution for dealing with terrorists, but instead creates a harmful
reputation that undermines the United States' alliances and
provides yet another al Qaeda propaganda tool, many call for its
closure. Even President Bush has commented on the desire to see
the detainment site closed "if he could do so without putting
Americans in greater danger., 23
That danger includes the
uncertainty of what to do with the dangerous detainees in
Guantanamo Bay. 24 Often times other nations will not accept the
return of these dangerous individuals, or, if they do, some will
mistreat them while others might even release them.
In the eagerness to close the Guantanamo Bay detention
facility, some have looked to the federal criminal courts as an
alternative means of dealing with terrorists. In some cases, these
courts have successfully convicted alleged terrorists of crimes
previously committed. However, the structure of the criminal
courts is not well-suited to handling terrorists' trials in the long-

18. Matthew Waxman, The Smart Way to Shut Gitmo Down, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
2007, at B04.
19. Id.

20.
21.

Id.
Id.

22.
23.
24.

Sulmasy, supra note 13.
Waxman, supra note 18.
Kelly Anne Moore, Take Al Qaeda to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at

A19.
25.

Waxman, supra note 18.
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term, especially when it comes to trials for detainment.
Kelly Ann Moore, former chief of the Violent Crimes and
Terrorism Section of the U.S. Attorneys' Office in the Easter
District of New York, purports that the federal system has a proven
track record of handling complex terrorist prosecutions. She
previously worked on terrorism-related cases as a federal
prosecutor and has worked closely with the prosecution of two
Yemeni citizens who conspired to send money to members of al
Qaeda and Hamas in support of terrorist activities. Even though
Moore successfully convicted the defendant-terrorists in that trial,
the complex issues posed by terrorist cases remain evident.
One such issue was the admission of classified evidence.
Moore admits that, generally, most classified evidence can be used
so long as it is either declassified or covered by a protective order.
Otherwise, as happened with some of the evidence in Moore's case,
the prosecution would have to exclude the classified evidence.
Katyal and Goldsmith recognize that in many cases "the evidence
against a particular detainee may be too difficult to present in open
without compromising intelligence sources and
civilian court
26
methods.

The issue of dealing with classified evidence is just one
example of the challenges posed by trying terrorists in federal
court. Robert Chesney, in a collaborative article with Goldsmith,
highlights the "very generous rights" of the criminal justice system
that pose challenges for trying terrorist cases: the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the rules against hearsay coupled
Clause; the
with the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
requirements of government disclosure of evidence that tends to
exculpate the accused; the defense's right to discovery of evidence
that will be used at trial; and the right to a trial that is open to the
public. 7 These, among other rights afforded to a defendant at
trial, reflect the social desire to let some guilty go free to ensure
that no innocent person is wrongfully convicted. But they have no
place in terrorist cases.28
The existing federal courts would need to be modified to
handle these unique and complex cases, but that cannot
• . 29 be done
without "ratcheting down justice" for civilian criminals. Andrew
26.
27.
28.
29.

Goldsmith & Katyal, supranote 11.
Chesney & Goldsmith, supranote 16, at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
McCarthy, supranote 15.
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McCarthy, a former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney who led the
prosecution of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and eleven others in
1995, argues that any "[pirinciples and precedents we create
in
S
,,30
terrorism cases generally get applied across the board .
Consequently, the court would have to treat terrorists like everyone
else, and therefore "everyone else is being treated worse."'" He
concludes that "the best escape

. .

. [is] to concede that the• existing
32

civilian judicial system generally does not work for terrorists."
The world is looking to the United States to demonstrate how
to bring terrorists into a system of law that protects individual rights
while still effectively dealing with security threats. It is evident that
neither the existing system in Guantanamo Bay nor a modification
of the federal courts will offer a long-term solution.
III. PROPOSING A NEW DETENTION SYSTEM: STRUCTURE OVERVIEW

Katyal and Goldsmith, two politically opposite national security
experts, came together to propose "a bipartisan solution that
reflects American values., 33 Their solution not only creates the
needed balance between security interests and individual interests
but also assists in rebuilding the United States' reputation.
Their proposal suggests a congressionally created system that
defines the enemy, reduces burdens on the ordinary civilian courts,
and specializes in dealing with alleged terrorists. Such a system
would handle classified evidence, detention, and other
34
complexities unique to terrorist cases.
Although a new court
would act only as a supplement to the existing federal criminal
courts, their system would serve two purposes: it would provide a
closed forum to hear cases involving classified evidence and it
would hear cases to preventatively detain those terrorists who have
not yet committed overt crimes. Terrorists who commit overt
criminal acts and whose trials do not require classified evidence
should still be tried in the federal criminal system.
The base concept proposed by Katyal and Goldsmith includes
limited but important details on the structure of the court system.
They argue that consistency with the Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause requires Congress to apply the rules of the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 11.
Id.
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system to both citizens and non-citizen terrorist detainees. Further,
this new court would have a specialized bench of judges and a
permanent staff of elite defense lawyers with special security
clearances. In order to appropriately handle the complexities of
terrorist cases, the court would not be able to offer the full panoply
of criminal protections. In addition, limited public and press
access would be essential in protecting classified evidence including
methods and sources. Katyal and Goldsmith also propose that the
decision of the court be subject to an appeal by a second lawyer
before a group of specialized judges. Finally, detainment orders
would require a renewal process to ensure that there is a
continuing rational for detention.
Katyal and Goldsmith's call for a new, balanced solution is not
unprecedented. Since 9/11, many scholars have proposed their
own ideas for a better detention system. Andrew McCarthy, for5
example, proposed a "new judicial paradigm" in May of 2004.1
Shortly thereafter, others joined in the discussion, including Glenn
Sulmasy,3 6 Robert Chesney, 7 A. John Radsan,M and Matthew
Waxman. 9 What makes Katyal and Goldsmith's proposed system of
detention unique is that it provides a bipartisan foundation from
which the discussion in the executive and legislative branches
should start.
A.

Defining the "Enemy"

Katyal and Goldsmith urge Congress to create a definition of
the

enemy;

however,

they

do

not

make

any

specific

recommendations on the content of the definition. In fact, while
35. McCarthy, supra note 15.
36. See Sulmasy, supra note 13. Glenn Sulmasy is a Professor of Law at the
United States Coast Guard Academy.
37. See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16 (analyzing the transitions of
traditional military tribunals and the federal court system to accommodate trying
terrorists). Robert Chesney is an associate professor at Wake Forest University
School of Law specializing in national security law who spoke at William Mitchell
College of Law's forum regarding post-9/11 policy on September 28, 2007.
38. See A. John Radsan, A Better Model for InterrogatingHigh-Level Terrorists, 79
TEMP. L. REv. 1227 (2006). A. John Radsan is a former federal prosecutor and
former Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency. He is
currently a Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law.
39. See Waxman, supra note 18. Matthew Waxman previously served as Acting
Director of the State Department's policy planning staff and as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs. He currently teaches at Columbia Law
School.
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many commentators insist that Congress specifically define the
enemy, few have proffered their own definition.4 ° Chesney and
Goldsmith emphasize that a definition of the enemy cannot be
overly broad, or it will too easily permit detention and undermine
the detainment system's legitimacy, but cannot be so narrow as to
prevent efficient and necessary detainment. 41 Similar to Bush's
definition of the enemy in the military commissions, Chesney and
Goldsmith offer a broad definition: membership in al Qaeda and
other terrorist organizations. 42 Although the Bush administration
expanded that definition to include anyone harboring members of
al Qaeda, Chesney and Goldsmith narrow it by requiring proof of
an individual's direct participation in the organization. 43
A. John Radsan makes a unique recommendation that avoids
an extreme generalization of the enemy. He suggests that any new
national security court "focus on prisoners who are truly the worst
of the worst."' 44 There should be no distinction between domestic
and international terrorism, but rather all perpetrators connected
"to the most significant terrorist plots" should fall within the scope
of this court.45 To create a well-drafted statute, Congress would
need to narrow the definition of the enemy by requiring "a
reasoned definition of terrorism . . . [with] a connection to an
actual or potential attack," and a minimum number of victims in
the plot in order to exclude "random acts of violence."46
One particularly relevant element of Radsan's proposal is a
well-defined system of checks to ensure that the statutory definition
of the enemy does not become too broadly applied or subjectively
used. Such checks include a limitation on the number of detainees
the executive branch can hold at any given time.47 Radsan
recommends one hundred as a reasonable total. Furthermore,
Radsan proposes the creation of a "list" of high-level terrorists who,
if captured, should be detained and interrogated. 48 Although this
40. Without a definition of the enemy, "it is all but impossible to establish a
judicial regime that meets constitutional muster." Amos N. Guiora, Where Are
Terrorists To Be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted To Suspected Terrorists,
56 CATH. U. L. REv. 805, 817 (2007).
41. Chesney & Goldsmith, supranote 16, at 45.
42. Id. at 45-47.
43. Id.
44. Radsan, supra note 38, at 1232.
45. Id. at 1234-35.
46. Id. at 1236.
47. Id. at 1244.
48. Id. at 1249.
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list would be highly sensitive in nature and not available to the
public, it could provide an objective standard to determine if an
alleged terrorist should be detained.
Defining the enemy will, and should, spur a strong debate.
Creating a definition that meets the demands of bipartisan
approval will be an essential first step in developing a new
detention system.
B.

SelectingJudges, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys

The "Terrorists' Court" would be composed of specialized
federal judges and lawyers. Katyal and Goldsmith propose that
judges chosen for the new detention system have life tenure. This
provides each judge with an opportunity to become an expert on
the issues peculiar to this realm, such as classified information, the
laws of war, and the Geneva Conventions. 49 An alternative proposal
by Glenn Sulmasy would require judicial candidates to be experts
in the law of armed conflict. Expertise would allow the judge to
determine the lawfulness of intelligence gathering and terrorist
surveillance.5 ' Regardless of whether expert knowledge is acquired
before or after appointment, it is agreed that the judge pool must
be limited and serve a term long enough to specialize in national
security issues.
One aspect not yet tackled by Katyal or Goldsmith is the issue
of how many appointed judges this new court would require.
McCarthy acknowledges that the number of judges depends on the
structure of the trials. 12 He proposes that a single judge preside
over the majority of cases and that capital cases have three or five
judges. In contrast, the FISA court, under the USA PATRIOT Act,
has eleven judges to handle thousands of applications per year.14
In comparison, Radsan offers that a new court would see less than a
thousand cases per year, thereby making five judges "sufficient to
handle the burden and to ensure impartiality through a range of

49. McCarthy, supra note 15.
50. Sulmasy, supra note 13.
51. Id.
52. See McCarthy, supra note 15.
53. Id.
54. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 207, 115 Stat. 272, 282 (2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. §1803(a) (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004)).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 7

5146

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:5

5

5
views and experiences.
In addition to long-term judges, a permanent staff of lawyers
would add expertise and legitimacy to the new system.5 6 Those
lawyers, according to Katyal and Goldsmith, would be permanent
and elite with special security clearances. Sulmasy and McCarthy
recommend that the Department of Justice, through a specialized
unit similar to the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section, create a
team of prosecutors with the discretion to determine whether to
57
proceed in a particular case.
Equally so, a team of defense lawyers, according to Katyal and
Goldsmith, should be created and made a permanent part of the
staff. These defense lawyers must not only have special security
clearances, but should also be trained in "the nuances of taking
apart interrogation statements, particularly translated statements"
since such statements
comprise the majority of evidence in
511
terrorism cases.
Sulmasy adds that a defense team should be
comprised of judge advocates that serve for the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. 59 The
government would appoint counsel to each suspect; however, a
suspect could employ and pay for his own civilian counsel if that
counsel has the needed security clearance. 0 Although traditional
detention models do not require government appointed defense
counsel, Chesney and Goldsmith reason that representing the
accused introduces "true adversariality" and enhances accuracy as
well as legitimacy. 1 Radsan agrees that representation should be
available. He suggests, however, that the court maintain a list of
nongovernmental lawyers with appropriate security clearances, who
the taxpayers will pay to defend the suspects.

C.Introducing ClassifiedEvidence
Just as the uniqueness of terrorist cases warrants special court
staffing, that uniqueness also necessitates special rules for dealing
with classified evidence and the media. A public proceeding could
disseminate classified information into the wrong hands.
55.

Radsan, supra note 38, at 1245.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 11.
McCarthy, supra note 15; Sulmasy, supranote 13.
Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 11.
Sulmasy, supra note 13.
Id.
Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 52.
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Essentially, a failure to properly protect classified information will
62
become an edification of terrorist organizations.
Katyal and
Goldsmith call for the new court to stop the dissemination of
information by dealing with classified evidence in a sensible way
63
and limiting the public and press access to the court.
There is a shortage of suggestions on exactly how the court can
"sensibly" treat the evidence. McCarthy, however, suggests a
resolution to one issue known as the "Brady Obligation."
Under
this rule, the government is required to disclose any evidence in its
possession that has any tendency to exculpate the accused. 65
McCarthy calls for a narrower obligation where the government
would only be required to disclose evidence to the defense when:
(a) the prosecutor intends to introduce it at trial, and (b) the
prosecutor has material, admissible evidence66 in its possession that
actually indicates the defendant is not guilty.

Others argue for stronger limitations, such as completely
closing the court from the public and press. Citing the recent
Moussaoui case, where the public media created a circus-like
atmosphere, Sulmasy reasons that the trials and proceedings
should be closed not only to prevent the dissemination of
information but also to prevent the trials from becoming
propaganda tools for the enemy. He suggests the attendance of
non-government organizations and the United Nations in an
"observers" role to ensure procedural fairness and legitimacy
68
during the closed trials.
Taking this suggestion further, Radsan
argues that since the court would be dealing with high-level
terrorists, it may be a target, and therefore the proceedings should
not only be closed, but should be classified and held at a secret
facility. 6

All participants in the court should have appropriate

security clearances and the information related to the proceedings
would need to be stored in a secure area.70 It follows that these
recommendations are the result of each authors' inherent
balancing of two competing interests: (1) rebuilding the nation's
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

McCarthy, supra note 15.
Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 11.
McCarthy, supra note 15.
See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 9 n.34 and accompanying text.
McCarthy, supra note 15.
Sulmasy, supra note 13.
Id.
Radsan, supra note 38, at 1245-46.
Id.
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reputation; and (2) the necessity of effective trials. The question of
how to properly balance these two interests should be central to the
analysis of how to structure a new "Terrorists' Court."
D. Detainment:ImplementingProceduralProtections
Another significant factor that Congress must address is the
type of procedural protections afforded to alleged terrorists. As
Katyal and Goldsmith propose, the detainees
"need not be given
•
,,71
the full panoply of criminal protections.
Reduced protections
might mean limited access to lawyers during interrogation or a
removal of the Miranda rights requirement.
McCarthy
acknowledges that the determination of how many rights to afford
an alleged terrorist requires a balance between individual fairness
and national security imperatives. 72 As stated by Waxman, "we
should move beyond the debate between those who say that only
traditional habeas corpus rights to a fair hearing can sort out these
cases and those who say that noncitizen enemy fighters captured
abroad in wartime have never been entitled to their day in court."73
He argues that we are all better off agreeing upon
74 the "minimum
law.
the
within
fit
to
needed
conditions"
acceptable
Waxman proposes that the minimum conditions needed for
long-term detainment include independent judicial review of the
factual basis for a detention, and a meaningful chance to challenge
that factual basis with the assistance of lawyers. That factual basis,
McCarthy says, should require a showing that hostilities are
ongoing, and that the alleged terrorist's detainment is in the
interest of national security.7 ' Furthermore, McCarthy argues that a
presumption of innocence "rebutt[able] only by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" is unnecessary and that a new court should only
require the government to prove its case by a preponderance of the
evidence.76
Radsan, however, suggests shifting the burdens of proof
according to the duration of detainment. Within forty-eight hours
of capture, the government would need to demonstrate probable
cause that the suspect is a terrorist. This low burden requirement
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Goldsmith & Katyal, supranote 11.
McCarthy, supranote 15.
Waxman, supranote 18.
Id.
McCarthy, supranote 15.

76.

Id.
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would justify three months of detention. Upon expiration, the
government would need to meet a higher burden of proof, such as
"by clear and convincing evidence," to renew the warrant. After six
months of detainment, the government would then provide access
to counsel and the suspect could challenge the government
findings.
Katyal and Goldsmith urge Congress to create a review process
to ensure a continuing rationale for detainment, especially when
detaining a person for years after the initial case. Like Radsan's
suggested timeline, most scholars agree that a review process is
necessary. McCarthy suggests a strong variation from Radsan's
recommendation. He proposes that if the government successfully
shows that hostilities are ongoing and that detaining this individual
is in the interest of national security, it can detain the suspect for
up to three years, which would be sufficient time to allow most
cases to resolve themselves." If an individual is still detained after
three years, the court would then require the government to prove
the case to a higher standard, a burden that should be obtainable
after three years of interrogation." McCarthy's suggestion does
require the court to accept the government's representations
regarding this burden, and may amount to no review at all so long
as the hostilities are ongoing.
Chesney and Goldsmith, on the
other hand, highlight that the current military commission uses an
annual review board, which releases a substantial number of
detainees each year."' Although the timing is under debate, a
requirement to justify ongoing detention is necessary to create the
appearance and reality of a legitimate legal process.
Another measure that Katyal and Goldsmith emphasize is the
right of a detainee, represented by a second lawyer, to appeal to an
independent judge. This appeals process would keep the initial
panel of judges "on their toes."8
Katyal and Goldsmith
recommend that the appeals go to "repeat judges.""2 McCarthy
suggests a more expansive option: the creation of a national
security appellate court whose decisions are appealable to the

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Chesney & Goldsmith, supranote 16, at 56-57.
81. Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 11.
82. Id. "Repeat judges" refers to a panel ofjudges that routinely hear appeals
from the "Terrorists' Court." Id.
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Supreme Court."' Sulmasy, however, recommends that the Court
of Appeals of the Armed Forces hears the initial appeal. This offers
an "outside
,,84 panel of judges versed in military law and the laws of
Experienced Air Force, Coast Guard, Navy-Marine
war. . ...
Corps, and Army appellate attorneys would act as counsel for the
appeal8 5
Sulmasy further supports his recommendation for using the
military appeals structure by suggesting that the actual detentions
86
take place on military bases throughout the United States.
Convicted terrorists, he suggests, should be imprisoned in military
brigs along with service members convicted under Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ) by courts-martial." Not only are these
facilities the most secure place to imprison a person, but they also
afford a terrorist the same protections against abuse provided to
88
While Waxman generally agrees
United States' service members.
with Sulmasy, he suggests the use of ultra-secure federal prisons as

well.89
IV. CONCLUSION
From the appointment of elite, specialized judges and lawyers
to the creation of a review and appeals process, a new detention
system and national security court attempts to balance the
inadequacies of the two existing systems. The military commissions
of Guantanamo Bay focused on the interests of national security
and sacrificed the United States' reputation as a nation of fair and

humane legal treatment. While the federal criminal courts provide
fair treatment needed to rebuild the reputation, they are ill
equipped to handle most terrorist cases without putting the nation
at risk.
Recognizing this dilemma, Neal Katyal worked not only to
persuade the United States Supreme Court from supporting the
executive-created military commissions, but has also joined with his
political opposite to move the nation as a whole into discussions of
a new long-term solution. Katyal and Goldsmith's proposal creates
83.

McCarthy, supra note 15.

84.

Sulmasy, supra note 13.

85.

Id.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Waxman, supra note 18.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss5/7

14

Boomsma: A New, Balanced System of Detention: An Analysis of Neal Katyal a

2008]

A BALANCED SYSTEM OF DETENTION

5151

a common ground that should act as a springboard for legislative
discussions. It is time for our nation to have terrorist trials and
detentions we can be proud of. It is time for trials that show our
allies and foes alike how the United States is a fair and just nation
that treats all people equally, and can do so without sacrificing the
nation's security.
When Katyal told Hamdan that America does not treat people
differently because of where they come from, he believed it. Now,
Neal Katyal has put before our nation the framework of a new
system to make that belief a reality.
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